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Abstract
Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015) document that in the United States there
is a discontinuity to the right of 0.5 in the distribution of households according
to the female share of total earnings which they attribute to the existence of a
gender identity norm. We provide an alternative explanation for this discontinu-
ity unrelated to the gender identity norm. Using linked employer-employee data
from Finland, we show that the discontinuity emerges as a result of equalization
and convergence of earnings in co-working couples, and it is associated with an
increase in the relative earnings of women, rather than a decrease as predicted
by the norm. We also provide evidence suggesting that co-working spouses may
play an important role in explaining the discontinuity observed in the United
States.
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According to the World Values Survey, 36% of Americans agree with the statement “[I]f
a woman earns more money than her husband, it’s almost certain to cause problems.”
In the European Union, this view is shared by 39% of the population.1 Bertrand et al.
(2015) suggest that a social norm assigning a bread-winner role to the husband may
affect the formation and separation of couples and it can induce high-earning married
women to reduce their labor supply. Using data from the United States, they argue that
this gender identity norm generates a discontinuity to the right of 0.5 in the distribution
of married couples by the share of income earned by the wife. The discontinuity can
be observed already in recently married couples and it grows with marriage tenure.
Bertrand et al. (2015) point out that it cannot be explained by classical marriage
market theories. Models that consider marriage as a partnership for the purpose of
joint production and joint consumption do not predict anything unusual around the
point where spouses have similar earnings. Similarly, models that consider marriage
as a source of gains from specialization do not attribute any particular significance to
the 0.5 point.
The existence of a discontinuity to the right of 0.5 in the relative earnings distri-
bution has been widely cited both in the media and in academia as evidence for the
relevance of the gender identity norm. Some authors have also pointed out that a
substantial part of the discontinuity is due to the existence of a point mass of cou-
ples exactly at 0.5 (Binder and Lam 2018, Hederos and Stenberg 2015).2 As shown
in panel (a) of Figure 1, the discontinuity to the right of 0.5 estimated by Bertrand
et al. (2015) becomes smaller if spouses with equal earnings are excluded, with the
McCrary (2008) estimate dropping from 12.3% to 7.4%.3
1World Values Survey 1995-1998, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
2Hederos and Stenberg (2015) show that in Sweden, the discontinuity can be partly attributed to
the existence of an excess mass of couples with identical earnings, particularly, in couples where at
least one of the spouses is self-employed. Binder and Lam (2018) point out that also in the United
States, the discontinuity is primarily driven by an excess mass of couples with identical earnings.
3Following Bertrand et al. (2015), we use administrative information on earnings in married couples
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation, the Social Security
Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service (SIPP/SSA/IRS). We use Completed Gold Standard
Files, in which some observations are substituted with imputed values. We drop these observations.
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In this paper, we provide evidence contradicting the social norm interpretation of
the discontinuity (and the point mass) at 0.5 and we propose an alternative explana-
tion. We use linked employer-employee data from Finland that has detailed information
on the individual employment and earnings history of the entire population of Finnish
individuals for the period between 1988 and 2014. Although women in Finland have
achieved a relatively high degree of equality in many dimensions, survey information
suggests that the gender norm regarding relative earnings in the households is as rele-
vant as in the United States. According to the World Values Survey 1995-1998, 33.9%
of Finns agreed with the idea that a woman should earn less than her husband to avoid
family problems.
As in Bertrand et al. (2015), in Finland, we observe a drop at 0.5 in the distribution
of households according to the female share of total earnings (see panel (b) of Figure 1).
The estimate of the discontinuity is of a similar magnitude as in the United States and,
similarly, about a third of the drop is due to the excess mass of spouses with identical
earnings. The discontinuity is also present in the first year of marriage. However, we
document several additional facts that, jointly, suggest that the gender identity norm
is not the cause for the observed shape of the distribution around 0.5.
First, we examine the distribution of relative earnings at the beginning of cohab-
itation, which provides a better proxy of the time of union formation than marriage.
We find no significant discontinuity at this stage of the relationship, suggesting that
the gender norm does not affect the formation of couples in a discontinuous way.
Second, the norm does not seem to play a role for separations either. Separation
rates do not exhibit any discontinuity around the 0.5 threshold of relative earnings.
Instead, the relationship between the probability of separation and the relative earnings
distribution exhibits a U-shape, with higher separation rates among couples with large
earnings differentials either in favor of the husband or in favor of the wife.
Third, the discontinuity in the distribution only arises in couples where both spouses
are self-employed (around 6% of all employed couples) or work together in the same
firm (around 9%). Hereafter, we refer to these two groups as co-working couples.
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For the rest of the population, there is no evidence of any unusual phenomena in the
vicinity of the 0.5 point. The pattern looks different for these two groups of co-working
couples. In the case of self-employed couples, the discontinuity to the right of 0.5 is
mainly due to a significant fraction of couples bunching exactly at 0.5, while among
spouses working for the same employer, the distribution exhibits a cliff at 0.5 with only
a small fraction of couples having identical earnings.
Fourth, the observed dynamics rules out a more specific formulation of the gender
identity norm theory, according to which the norm is activated only when spouses
are jointly self-employed or work in the same firm. Theoretically, this may occur if
co-working makes the comparison between spouses more salient or if adjustments in
accordance with the norm are feasible only in self-employed couples. We find that the
discontinuity does not arise as a result of a reduction in the share of couples where
women slightly outearn their husbands, as the gender identity norm would predict.
Instead, when couples on both sides of the distribution become self-employed, they
tend to equalize earnings leading to an excess mass at 0.5. Similarly, when couples
start working together in the same firm, there is a compression of earnings toward 0.5.
Since initially there are more couples where women earn less than men, this earnings
compression creates a larger mass of couples just to the left of 0.5 than to the right of
this point, which statistical tests identify as a discontinuity. Moreover, we also observe
that co-working leads to an increase in female earnings above the earnings of similar
women in non-co-working couples.
Overall, our results contradict the idea that the gender identity norm exhibits a
discontinuity at the point of equal earnings. Some couples may prefer that the husband
earns more than his wife, but small variations around the 0.5 point do not seem to make
that much of a difference.
There are several factors that may generate earnings equalization in self-employed
couples. Self-employed spouses may report identical earnings when they face strong
fiscal incentives to do so.4 In Finland, such incentives may be generated by individual
4There is evidence that self-employed couples may misreport their earnings to minimize the tax
burden (Harju and Matikka 2016; Kabatek, van Soest, and Stancanelli 2014; Kleven, Kreiner, and
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income tax filing under a progressive scale. In other countries where joint filing is possi-
ble, incentives for reporting equal earnings may be created by the existence of itemized
deductions (e.g., deductions for mortgage interest on a loan or for medical expenses in
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany). The legal environment may
also incentivize equal income sharing. In some countries, including Finland, businesses
registered as partnerships must split entrepreneurial profits equally between the part-
ners in the absence of a specific written agreement. In fact, in our data we observe
that the share of equal earners is the largest in partnerships, signaling the importance
of legal defaults for income splitting. Many self-employed couples may also use rules
of thumb for income splitting within the family. Consistently, we observe substantial
bunching of relative earnings also at other salient shares, such as 0.4 and 0.3.
There are also several possible forces that may lead to earnings convergence in
couples where spouses work in the same firm. Rent sharing and within-firm pay eq-
uity constraints may result in a lower within-firm variability in pay (Breza, Kaur,
and Shamdasani 2018; Dube, Giuliano, and Leonard 2019; Saez, Schoefer, and Seim
2019). To understand the role played by such earnings compression within firms, we
randomly paired unrelated male and female co-workers and examined the evolution
of the relative earnings distribution in these fictitious couples. We observe that, over
the time the two randomly matched individuals work together in the same firm, their
earnings converge and a discontinuity at 0.5 in the distribution of the female share
arises. This result indicates that the earnings convergence and discontinuity observed
among actual couples is, at least partly, induced by firm-level pay compression. In
addition to firm-level dynamics, spouses co-working in the same firm may experience
earnings convergence as a result of joint negotiations with the employer or, perhaps,
direct favoritism. These mechanisms would explain why women in co-working couples
earn more than observationally similar women in non-co-working couples.
Finally, we provide some suggestive evidence about the potential relevance of this
mechanism for the U.S. labor market. As in Bertrand et al. (2015), we use admin-
Saez 2009; LaLumia 2008; Schuetze 2006; Stephens and Ward-Batts 2004).
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istrative information on earnings for a sample of U.S. households from 1990-2004.
Unfortunately, the dataset does not offer information on whether spouses work in the
same firm or are jointly self-employed. Instead, we use the available information on
spouses’ industry and occupation to identify a group of spouses with a larger proba-
bility of working together. As shown by Hyatt (2015), the likelihood to have a shared
workplace tends to be particularly high among spouses working in the same indus-
try and occupation. We find that, in this group of couples, the “missing” mass of
households in which women slightly outearn their husbands is twice as large as in the
overall population. Arguably, this pattern is more consistent with the hypothesis of
earnings convergence in couples working together than with the explanation based on
the existence of the gender identity norm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly illustrates how
earnings convergence and equalization within couples can generate a discontinuity in
the distribution of couples according to the wife’s share of earned income. This section
also formulates the main testable implications. In section 3, we describe the data used
in the empirical part. In section 4, we document the existence of a discontinuity in
the distribution of the female share in Finland, we explore whether the discontinuity is
limited to co-working couples and analyze how the distribution changes around the time
when spouses start working together. Finally, in section 5, we discuss the implications
of our results.
2 Potential explanations of the discontinuity
Bertrand et al. (2015) document that the distribution of households according to the
relative earnings of women exhibits a discontinuity to the right of 0.5, which partly
reflects the existence of a point mass at 0.5. Below, we first discuss how the gender
identity norm may potentially generate this pattern. We then examine a number of
alternative mechanisms that may generate empirically similar shape of the distribution.
In particular, we study how the distribution of relative earnings within couples would
be affected if (i) in some couples earnings were equalized, (ii) some couples experienced
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convergence in earnings, and (iii) data on individual earnings were subject to rounding.
We then outline several testable implications that allow us to distinguish among these
theories empirically.
2.1 Gender identity norm
The gender identity norm in which women should not outearn their husbands may
generate the distribution of relative earnings that is observed in the data in several
ways. First, relatively fewer couples may form where women outearn men. Second,
the likelihood of divorce may be higher in couples where women earn more than their
husbands. Third, when couples are formed, high-earning women may adjust their labor
supply so that their earnings do not surpass their husbands’. These adjustments may
create a discontinuity at 0.5 in the distribution of households according to the relative
earnings of women and, if individuals can perfectly manipulate their relative incomes,
they may also create an excess mass of couples with spouses having identical earnings.
To illustrate a possible impact of the norm as well as the following arguments, we
perform a simulation exercise. Female and male earnings are drawn from two gamma
distributions where men are assumed to have higher average earnings. We construct
couples by randomly matching men and women. The resulting distribution of the wife’s
share of earnings is shown in blue-colored dots in panel (a) of Figure 2.5
To simulate the impact of the gender identity norm, we consider a simple scenario
where the norm affects a given proportion of couples where women initially outearn
their husbands. To comply with the norm, these couples adjust the female share down
until it reaches the point with equal earnings. Red dots on panel (a) show the relative
earnings distribution after this adjustment takes place. A red line shows the estimate
of the density function obtained using the McCrary (2008) procedure, allowing for
discontinuity at 0.5. As in Bertrand et al. (2015), we use right-closed bins. There is
5In the figure, female and male earnings are distributed respectively as Γ(5, 5000) and Γ(7, 5000).
Gamma-distribution and parameters of the distribution are selected to mimic the shape of the actual
earnings distribution with no negative values, a large mass of individuals with moderate earnings,
and a thin right tail. The average earnings of men and women in the simulated data are 35,000 and
25,000, respectively, resembling actual values of annual earnings in euros.
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a visible drop in the distribution at 0.5. The McCrary test identifies a discontinuity
also after if we exclude the 0.5 mass from the estimation, reflecting the decrease of the
density estimate to the right of this point.
2.2 Equalization of earnings
Let us consider another mechanism that might affect the distribution of relative earn-
ings. Some spouses may equalize earnings for other reasons than the gender norm, for
instance, due to fiscal or legal incentives. Another source of earnings equalization may
be the existence of salary schedules within firms. Many firms offer salary schedules to
their workers that include a limited number of pay grades, increasing the probability
that couples working in the same firm receive the same salary.
We illustrate this case in panel (b) of Figure 2. In this figure, a random proportion
of couples on both sides of the distribution equalize earnings. The bunching at 0.5
emerges, creating an apparent discontinuity to the right of this point. However, note
that no discontinuity would be observed if the mass at 0.5 was excluded from the
distribution.
2.3 Earnings convergence within the couple
Some couples who work together may experience convergence in earnings as a result
of rent sharing and fairness considerations at the firm level. As we explain below, this
process may also generate an excess mass at 0.5 and a discontinuity to the right of this
point.
We examine two types of convergence. First, we consider steplike earnings conver-
gence. Couples on both sides of the distribution adjust their relative earnings by a
certain fixed amount toward equal earnings. As shown in panel (c) of Figure 2, this
adjustment compresses the distribution around 0.5 and creates a bunching at 0.5. Since
initially there are more couples in which husbands outearn their wives than couples in
which women earn relatively more, the process creates a discontinuity between the left
and right limits of the density function, which persists when the mass at point 0.5 is
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excluded.
Second, we consider the case when the earnings of spouses converge by a random
factor uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 (see panel (d) of Figure 2). In this case,
earnings compression leads to an asymmetric peak distribution of relative earnings.
Technically, the distribution is continuous with a kink at 0.5, however, the McCrary
(2008) test produces a significant estimate of the drop at 0.5.6 In panel (e), we show
the resulting distribution if only 10% of couples co-work and experience earnings con-
vergence by a random factor. The distribution appears much smoother, but the discon-
tinuity is still significant. Notably, the discontinuity shown in panels (d) and (e) is not
related to the presence of an excess mass at 0.5. In fact, in the simulation presented
here, no couples have identical earnings.
A common feature of these two processes is that changes in the rank order of
individual earnings within the couple are not allowed. Earnings compression without
restrictions on the rank order may not lead to a kink or a discontinuity.
2.4 Rounding of individual earnings
A related phenomenon is rounding. Very often the available data on individual earnings
is subject to rounding, either by statistical offices or, in survey data, by respondents.
To examine this issue, we round the individual earnings of individuals and compute
the wife’s share of earnings based on the rounded values. As we show in panel (f)
of Figure 2, rounding generates several bunching points and discontinuities in the
distribution of relative earnings, particularly to the right of 0.5.
This illustration shows that, even when the underlying distribution does not exhibit
a discontinuity, rounding the data might generate one. Survey data might thus be
inappropriate to study the existence of a discontinuity in the distribution of relative
earnings. It might also be non-trivial to infer the existence of a gender identity norm
in reporting based on the comparison of survey and administrative data.7
6The estimate is robust to the reduction of the default bandwidth to half, following the recommen-
dations by McCrary (2008) for robust asymptotic inference.
7Murray-Close and Heggeness (2018) compare the earnings reported by participants in the Current
Population Survey with their actual earnings, which they observe in administrative data. They find
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2.5 Testable implications
While both the gender identity norm and earnings equalization or convergence in co-
working couples may lead to an excess mass and a discontinuity to the right of 0.5
in the distribution of the female share of earnings, the two hypotheses have different
implications in several other dimensions.
Start of the relationship The two hypotheses have different implications regarding
the moment in the relationship when the discontinuity emerges. According to the
gender identity norm hypothesis, the discontinuity may exist already at the start of the
relationship, because of selective couple formation. Instead, the hypothesis of earnings
convergence and equalization in co-working couples does not predict a discontinuity in
the sample of newly formed couples, unless they were already working together.
Separation and divorce The gender identity norm hypothesis predicts that couples
where women initially earn just a bit more than their husbands may have a higher
likelihood to separate, either because they failed to anticipate the importance of the
gender identity norm or because they only learned over time about the earnings of their
partners. Instead, the forces that lead to earnings equalization or convergence are not
expected to create a discontinuity or a kink in the separation rate at the point where
spouses have identical earnings at the beginning of the relationship.
Affected couples The two hypotheses differ in their predictions regarding the type
of couples that are expected to exhibit a discontinuity and an excess mass at 0.5. The
gender identity norm should be more relevant among couples with more traditional
values. Instead, the earnings convergence and equalization predict the discontinuity
and a mass of equal earners only among couples that work together. In particular,
spouses in self-employed couples should be more likely to earn the same, while spouses
co-working in the same firm are expected to exhibit a compressed distribution of relative
that in couples where women earn more than husbands, women are relatively more likely to underre-
port their earnings and men to overreport them, and they attribute this discrepancy to the impact of
the gender identity norm on reporting.
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earnings around the point with equal earnings and a cliff at 0.5.
There is a refinement of the gender identity norm theory that might potentially
rationalize the existence of a discontinuity uniquely in co-working couples. The norm
itself may be “activated” only when both spouses work together because it makes the
comparison of their positions and earnings more salient. It is also possible that only
jointly self-employed couples may effectively implement the adjustments necessary to
abide by the gender norm. Next, we consider several testable implications that allow
disentangling this specific version of the gender identity norm theory from the earnings
equalization and convergence hypothesis.
Dynamics The two hypotheses have different predictions regarding the changes in
the relative earnings distribution around the start of co-working. The gender identity
norm predicts that there will be a decrease in the share of couples in which the wife
outearns her husband. Instead, the hypothesis of earnings equalization and convergence
predicts that individual earnings in couples on both sides of the distribution will tend
to equalize.
Moreover, for couples formed at the workplace, the two hypotheses have also a
distinct prediction regarding the timing of the adjustments. The gender identity norm
would predict that couples should reduce the female share soon after the start of
the relationship. In the case of the earnings convergence hypothesis, the prediction
is ambiguous. If earnings convergence is due to firm-level forces that generate wage
compression, the adjustment may already happen before the couple has been formed.
Instead, if the adjustment reflects joint bargaining or information sharing within the
couple, convergence may also arise after the start of the relationship.
Counterfactual earnings If co-working “activates” the gender identity norm, women
who start co-working with their spouses are expected to earn, on average, less than com-
parable non-co-working women. The earnings convergence hypothesis does not provide
a clear prediction. On the one hand, it is possible that co-working spouses are willing
to accept a lower salary because they appreciate the joint location or other amenities
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associated with co-working. On the other hand, co-working spouses may have a better
bargaining position with their employer or they may have access to better information
allowing them to negotiate higher salaries.
Earnings distribution in placebo co-working couples The social norm assign-
ing family-level gender roles provides no prediction regarding the relative earnings of
unrelated employees working in the same firm. In particular, we should not expect
to find a discontinuity in the distribution of the relative earnings of individuals in fic-
titious couples formed by randomly matching unrelated co-working women and men.
Instead, the hypothesis of firm-level wage convergence does predict compression of the
distribution of the female share and possibly also the emergence of a discontinuity.
3 Data
We use the Finnish employer-employee linked database (FLEED), which contains reg-
istry information on the entire Finnish population from 1988 to 2014. We restricted
the sample to working-age individuals (18 to 65 years old). In this section, we describe
the primary features of the dataset.
3.1 Couples
We follow the classification of Statistics Finland, which considers two individuals as
a couple if they are cohabiting, married, or have a registered civil partnership.8 The
sample includes around 2.6 million couples and each couple is observed on average for
11 years. About 1.5 million of these couples were formed after 1988, which is the first
year available in our database.
The main variable of interest is annual labor earnings, which includes individual
earned income and entrepreneurial income. Annual earnings are not top-coded and
8Two individuals are considered cohabiting if they are of different sex, live permanently in the same
dwelling, are at least 18 years old, their age difference is at most 15 years, they do not have a spouse
and they are not siblings. 83% of couples are identified by Statistics Finland based on individuals’
cohabitation status.
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they are not rounded. As shown in Figure A1 in the Appendix, at the time of couple
formation around 42% of a couple’s earnings are accrued by the woman. The relative
earnings of women tend to rapidly decrease afterward, falling to 35% after six years
into the relationship, and they slowly catch up later.
3.2 Co-working spouses
Statistics Finland provides information on the identity of employers for about 90% of
couples of wage-earners. Both spouses share the same employer in 9% of these couples
and, within this group, two-thirds of couples work in the same establishment. Employer
identifiers are not available whenever this information may allow for the identification
of an individual, something that is more likely to happen in small family businesses.
Therefore, the figure above may slightly underestimate the overall share of couples
who work together. Furthermore, in 6% of couples, both spouses are self-employed.
In general, we do not observe whether self-employed couples work together, but we
observe that most of them work in the same 5-digit industry, suggesting that in most
cases self-employed couples actually work together.
The workplace appears to be the meeting place for some spouses, however, for most
couples, cohabitation precedes co-working. Around one-third of couples who ever co-
work in the same firm were already working together when they started to cohabit.
The median time to co-working in the same firm after cohabitation is 3 years and the
median time to simultaneous self-employment is 6 years.
Women are more likely than men to change employer or main activity to become
co-employed with their spouses. In couples where both spouses were already employed
before co-working, the woman joins the firm of her husband in 47% of cases, the man
joins the firm of his wife in 35% of cases, and in 18% of cases, both spouses change
the employer. About 39% of women who start working with their partners were not
employed the year earlier, while this is true only for 18% of men.
As shown in Figure A2, there are no large differences in couples’ initial relative
earnings depending on whether they will co-work in the future or not. Women earn
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44% of household earnings at the beginning of the relationship in couples who never
co-work, compared to 43% in couples that will work the same firm and 41% if couples
that become jointly self-employed.
4 Empirical Analysis
We start the analysis by documenting the existence of a sharp drop at the 0.5 point in
the distribution of Finnish households according to the wife’s share of earned income.
We then use the testable implications outlined in section 2.5 to study whether this
discontinuity is due to the gender norm or, alternatively, to earnings convergence and
equalization among co-working couples. Finally, after showing that earnings equal-
ization and convergence in co-working couples drive the discontinuity in Finland, we
discuss the relevance of this mechanism for explaining the evidence from the United
States.
4.1 Discontinuity in the relative income distribution
Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows the distribution of couples according to the wife’s share
of household labor earnings in a sample of couples where both spouses are employed
and have positive earnings. On the y-axis, the figure reports the fraction of couples
in a 2% relative income bins. As in Bertrand et al. (2015), we use right-closed bins.
About a third of this drop is due to the existence of an excess mass of couples where
both spouses have the same earnings, who constitute 0.9% of all employed couples.
When these couples are excluded from the sample, the remaining drop at 0.5 is equal
to 11.3% according to the McCrary (2008) test (Table 1, first row). The magnitude of
the discontinuity is similar to the one observed in the United States.
As pointed out by Binder and Lam (2018), it is misleading to describe the excess
mass at 0.5 as a “discontinuity” to the right (or to the left) of this point. Bunching at
equal earnings creates a jump in the cumulative distribution of relative earnings and
makes the theoretical density function at 0.5 equal to infinity. To avoid this problem,
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in what follows we always drop equal earners when we estimate the limits of the density
function at 0.5.
4.2 Relative earnings in newly formed couples
Bertrand et al. (2015) use the time of marriage as a proxy for the time of couple
formation and show that a discontinuity exists among newlywed couples. In Finland,
we also observe a significant drop in the estimated density function of relative earnings
when we limit the sample to newly married couples. In this sample, 0.2% of spouses
have identical earnings and a discontinuity is estimated to be 4.1%, significant at
1% (see Appendix Table A1). However, this result is entirely driven by co-working
couples, who constitute about 11% of employed newlywed couples. Among co-working
couples, 2% have equal earnings and the discontinuity is 19.3%, while among non-co-
working couples, there are no equal earners and the discontinuity is 2.9%, statistically
insignificant.
In our data, we can also use the start of cohabitation as a proxy for the time of
couple formation. In Finland, the median cohabitation tenure among newlyweds is
3.5 years and only 31% of initially cohabiting couples are observed to get married
eventually. When we consider the earnings of spouses at the time when individuals
start to cohabit, the distribution does not exhibit a significant discontinuity at 0.5.
This is true both for cohabiting couples that eventually get married and for those who
never marry. Once again, the only exception is couples formed at the workplace, for
whom the drop is estimated to be 11.3%.
4.3 Separation and divorce
Figure 3 shows how the probability that a couple separates varies depending on the
initial distribution of earnings within the household. Interestingly, the likelihood to
separate exhibits a U-shape. The separation rate is the highest among couples with very
unequal earnings, either in favor of men or in favor of women. The lowest separation
rates are among couples where the woman earns about 40-45% of the total family
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earnings. There is no discontinuity in the probability of separation around the equal
earnings point. This pattern is difficult to reconcile with the gender identity norm
exhibiting a discontinuity at 0.5.9
4.4 Who does exhibit the discontinuity and the spike at 0.5?
4.4.1 Co-working spouses
Figure 4 reports the relative earnings distribution separately for co-working and not-co-
working couples using information for all years of the relationship. In the subsample
of non-co-working spouses, we do not observe any discontinuity or missing mass of
couples with women just outearning their husbands (panel a). As shown in Table 1,
only 0.01% of these households are formed by equally earning spouses, and the estimate
of the discontinuity at 0.5 is -0.2%, with the 95% confidence interval between 0.6% and
-1.0%.
Instead, among co-working spouses, there is an excess mass of couples with part-
ners having identical earnings and a sharp drop in the estimated limits of the density
function at 0.5 (panel b). 6.2% of co-working spouses have the same earnings and the
estimated drop at 0.5 is equal to 41%.
4.4.2 Self-employment versus working in the same firm
Figure 5 shows the relative earnings distributions separately for self-employed couples
and couples working in the same firm. The two groups exhibit different patterns.
Among self-employed couples, there is a large excess mass and a discontinuity at 0.5,
while among spouses working in the same firm, the share of spouses with identical
earnings is small but there is still a discontinuity at 0.5.
In Table 1 we report the share of equal earners in each group and the McCrary
(2008) estimate for the discontinuity. 13.4% of self-employed couples have identical
earnings, and there are 62% more couples just below the 0.5 threshold than just above.10
9Newman and Olivetti (2018) propose a possible explanation. They argue that the increased
bargaining flexibility in two-earner marriages makes them more durable than single-earner households.
10Apart from couples with identical earnings, many self-employed couples have almost identical
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In couples working in the same firm, 0.4% of spouses have identical earnings. The drop
in the density is estimated to be 9% and it is largely driven by couples working in
the same establishment, where the discontinuity is 16%. There is little evidence of
discontinuity in households that work in different establishments of the same firm.
In Table 2 we investigate whether the above pattern is driven by couples working
in a particular sector of the economy (agriculture, trade, manufacturing, education,
or other sectors), in firms with a particular legal form (natural person, partnership,
limited company, or other types), or in establishments of a certain size (less than 5
employees vs. 5-49 employees). In columns 1-3 we focus on self-employed couples.
A high fraction of equal earners is present in all these different subgroups; however,
equal earners are more prevalent in partnerships, reaching 35%. This is consistent
with the legal default prescribing equal income-sharing in partnerships. The estimated
discontinuity in the limits of the density function at 0.5 is statistically significant in all
considered subsamples, but it is the largest in agriculture and small establishments.
Similarly, among spouses working in the same firm, the discontinuity is statistically
significant in all sectors of the economy, across all legal forms and sizes of estab-
lishments (columns 4-6). The proportion of equal earners and the discontinuity are
particularly large in agriculture, wholesale and retail trade, and in firms run as small
family businesses. In none of these groups, the share of equal earners is larger than 3%.
4.4.3 Couples with different educational levels
According to the World Values Survey, less-educated individuals are more likely to
agree with the statement that a woman should earn less than her husband to avoid
problems. Bertrand et al. (2015) employ spouses’ educational level as a proxy for the
prevalence of the gender norm. Consistently with the gender identity norm hypothesis,
they find that the drop in the distribution of relative earnings is larger among less-
educated couples.
earnings. Nevertheless, there is a discrepancy between the left and the right limits of the density
function at 0.5, even if observations in the vicinity of 0.5 are not taken into account for inferring those
limits.
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In Table A2 and Figure A4 in the Appendix, we examine the interaction between
spouses’ educational level and co-working status. In Finland, as in the United States,
the “missing” mass of couples with women just outearning their spouses is larger among
less-educated couples. The estimated drop at 0.5 is 4.5% among college-educated cou-
ples, and it is 17% among less-educated ones. However, among both college and non-
college educated couples, the discontinuity is present only among co-working spouses,
who constitute about 12% of all higher educated couples and 17% of the less-educated
couples. Among couples that do not work together, there is no excess mass or discon-
tinuity at the 0.5 point, independent of the spouses’ educational level. In this case, the
estimate is a precise zero.
4.5 Evolution of the relative earnings in co-working couples
Next, we analyze the evolution of the distribution of relative earnings in co-working
couples. First, we study the changes around the start of co-working in couples that ini-
tially were not working together. Second, we consider couples formed at the workplace
and analyze the changes in the distribution around the start of cohabitation.
4.5.1 Couples who start co-working over time in the relationship
In Figure 6, we explore the evolution of the relative earnings distribution for spouses
who start co-working after they formed a couple. The results are presented separately
for couples who become jointly self-employed (plots on the left) and couples who start
co-working in the same firm (plots on the right).
Let us first consider spouses that eventually become jointly self-employed. Consis-
tent with our previous analysis, there is no discontinuity at the start of cohabitation
(in blue on panel a). The year before the couple starts co-working, female earnings
tend to be lower than at the beginning of the relationship (in red on panel a) but the
shape of the relative earnings distribution is generally similar to the initial shape. The
distribution of earnings changes radically when spouses become jointly self-employed
(in red on panel c). A substantial fraction of women begin to have the same or very
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similar earnings as their husbands, while the proportion of all other combinations of
spousal earnings decreases.11 Visually, there is no obvious discontinuity in the empiri-
cal density function if we ignore observations just around 0.5. Three years after spouses
become self-employed, more couples start having relatively more similar earnings (in
red on panel e), and the discontinuity at 0.5 between the left and right limits of the
density function becomes salient. The McCrary estimate of this mismatch between the
left and the right limit of the density function at 0.5 is 14%. In sum, the evidence
for self-employed couples suggests that a sizable proportion of these couples tend to
equalize earnings immediately after starting a family business. There is also a gradual
convergence of earnings in these couples over time.
Let us now look at spouses who eventually start working in the same firm. At
the start of cohabitation, the distribution of relative earnings in this sample is smooth
around 0.5 (in blue on panel b). With time in the relationship, women start earnings
relatively less, but the shape of the distribution of the female share is generally similar
(in red on panel b). The distribution changes immediately after spouses start sharing
the employer (panel d). There is a substantial increase in the share of couples where
women earn between 30% and 55% of household earnings, and there is a thinning of
both left and right tails of the distribution. In a small fraction of couples, women
start earning exactly as much as their husbands, and a discontinuity appears at the 0.5
point. The estimated drop is equal to 15% and it is statistically significant. Overall,
as a result of this convergence, there is an increase in the average relative earnings of
women. The distribution remains stable in the following years (panel f).
This evidence is inconsistent with the discontinuity being caused by the gender
identity norm, which predicts a decrease in the female share. Instead, we observe an
increase both in the share of couples where men slightly outearn their wives and in the
share of couples where women slightly outearn their husbands, but the increase in the
former group is larger, and it generates a discontinuity around 0.5.
11Figure A3 in the Appendix compares the distribution of the initial female share in couples that
eventually equalize their earnings with the corresponding distribution in all couples. It is clear that
couples who equalize their earnings come from both sides of the distribution.
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4.5.2 Couples formed at the workplace
In Figure A5 in the Appendix, we analyze the evolution of the distribution of relative
earnings in couples formed among individuals working in the same firm. We focus on
the sample of couples who were already working together three years before the start
of cohabitation and still work together one year after.
The distribution of the female share becomes substantially compressed around 0.5
from both sides of the distribution about two years before the start of cohabitation.
The McCrary test detects a discontinuity at the point of equal earnings of about 16%.
However, the distribution remains almost unchanged one year before and one year
after co-working individuals start to cohabit. Overall, the dynamics are consistent
with earnings convergence in co-working couples, either due to earnings compression
at the firm level or due to information-sharing among future spouses already before
the start of cohabitation.
4.6 Actual and potential earnings
If co-working “activates” the gender identity norm, women who start co-working with
their spouses would earn, on average, less than comparable non-co-working women. In
this section, we compare the evolution of earnings for women who started co-working
with their husbands with the evolution for women who never worked together with their
spouses, taking into account observable differences in predetermined characteristics.
We also conduct the same analysis for men. To predict the counterfactual earnings of
co-working women, we first estimate the following set of equations on the subsamples







2 + i,k,t (1)
where Yi,k,t represents real earnings in year t of individual i who has cohabited with
her or his spouse for k years. Xi is a vector of predetermined characteristics measured
the year before the start of cohabitation, which includes the main activity (employed,
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unemployed, student, pensioner, conscript, unemployment pension, other inactive),
industry (20 categories), occupation (10 categories), establishment size (10 categories),
earnings, indicator for zero earnings, age dummies, nationality (Finnish or other),
family structure (7 categories), interaction between educational level (6 categories)
and field (8 categories), and region of residence. Dt are year dummies.
We then use the estimates from this model for out-of-the-sample prediction of coun-
terfactual earnings for individuals who choose to co-work with their spouses at some
point in the relationship. In panels (a) and (c) of Figure 7, we compare the earnings of
co-working spouses with their counterfactual using a ten-year window around the start
of joint self-employment. The earnings of men and women who at some point in their
relationship become jointly self-employed with their spouses are initially similar to the
earnings of other individuals with similar characteristics. Before becoming jointly self-
employed, both men and women tend to experience a negative earnings shock, but the
shock is relatively larger in the case of women.12 The trajectory of men and women
changes after the start of self-employment. The earnings of men drop substantially
the year when they become self-employed. Instead, the earnings of women increase
and almost reach the counterfactual level. As we show in Appendix Figure A6, this
catch-up in female earnings is mostly due to an increase in employment rates.
The fact that family earnings remain below the counterfactual level after the start
of joint self-employment is consistent with couples choosing self-employment as a way
to recover from a negative employment shock. Some families with children may be
also willing to accept lower earnings in exchange for the flexibility of work schedules
in self-employment. There is also evidence suggesting that self-employed couples shift
income between wages and dividends for fiscal reasons (Harju and Matikka 2016).
Panels (b) and (d) of Figure 7 show the analysis, respectively, for women and
men who at some point in the relationship start working in the same firm. While
initially, the earnings of individuals in future co-working couples are similar to the
12As we show in Appendix Figure A6, two years before the start of co-working, the employment
rate of women falls below their potential. The aggregate earnings differential is both due to lower
employment and lower earnings conditional on employment.
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counterfactual level, before the start of co-working, female earnings fall slightly short
of the counterfactual level.13 After the start of co-working, women start earning 25%
more than non-co-working women with similar predetermined characteristics, while
men’s earnings become about 7% higher than the counterfactual level. As we show in
Figure A7 in the Appendix, the increase in male earnings can be entirely attributed
to the increase in employment probability, while female earnings increase both due to
the elevated probability of employment and earnings conditional on employment.
The increase in female earnings above the potential predicted by predetermined
observable characteristics is consistent with several hypotheses. Women in co-working
couples may have a stronger bargaining position in wage negotiations or they may be
favored. Couples may also choose to co-work only if co-working implies a substantial
improvement in female earnings.
4.7 Pairs of unrelated co-working women and men
We analyze the evolution of relative earnings in placebo couples, which we construct
by randomly matching unrelated co-working women and men. Specifically, we first
selected a 5% random sample of all possible pairs of co-working men and women who
were never observed as cohabiting or married in our data. We then imposed two
restrictions on the educational level and age differences between individuals in these
pairs so that they correspond to typical matches observed in the marriage market.
First, we considered pairs formed by individuals who either both have achieved, at
most, high school education or both have at least some college education. Second,
we limited the analysis to pairs in which men are between four and zero years older
than women. Over two-thirds of actual couples in Finland satisfy the first condition
and over half the second. After applying the age restriction, the average age gap in
fictitious couples is two years, the same as in actual ones. Finally, to be able to study
the dynamics of relative earnings over time, we considered individuals who co-worked
for at least 15 years in the same plant. About 80% of these placebo couples work in
13As we show in Appendix Figure A7, the disadvantage in earnings among co-working women is
due to a slightly lower employment rate.
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firms with at least one cohabiting couple.
Figure 8 shows the evolution of the distribution of the female share in the placebo
couples. One year before individuals start to co-work in the same firm, the distribution
of the female share of earnings is smooth over 0.5. One year after the start of co-
working, the distribution becomes substantially more compressed, but no discontinuity
at 0.5 is detected (see estimates in Appendix Table A3). Over time, the earnings of
individuals continue converging, and a cliff at 0.5 emerges. After five years of co-
working, the estimated drop at 0.5 is 14.6%, significant at 1%. A similar drop is still
observed after 15 years.
The existence of a discontinuity among placebo co-working couples suggests that the
observed discontinuity among co-working spouses is, at least partly, due to firm-level
earnings compression.
4.8 Discontinuity at other points of the distribution
We explore whether there exist bunching and discontinuity at other points of the rela-
tive earnings distribution, besides point 0.5. In particular, we estimate discontinuities
to the right of each 2-percentage point bin between 0.1 and 0.9. To facilitate the
comparison, we keep observations at 0.5. We consider separately the following three
groups: non-co-working couples, self-employed couples, and couples working in the
same firm. In the case of non-co-working couples, we do not expect any discontinuities
at any point of the distribution. For couples working in the same firm, we only expect
a discontinuity at the 0.5 point. Finally, in self-employed couples, the existence of ad-
hoc rules for entrepreneurial income sharing may generate spikes and discontinuities
at other salient bin-separating points.
We report our results in Appendix Figure A8. In the sample of non-co-working
couples, out of 40 estimates, only one is significant at 5% level (p-value=0.020). In the
sample of couples working in the same firm, a large discontinuity at 0.5 affects the esti-
mates of the limits of the density function in other neighboring points, however, there
is only one estimate outside the vicinity of 0.5 significant at the 5% (p-value=0.016).
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Given the number of tested parameters, these discontinuities are likely to be false pos-
itives and, overall, we cannot reject that the density function is smooth away from
0.5. For self-employed couples, we observe significant bunching of observations in the
vicinity of several points, most importantly, around 0.4, 0.3, 0.33, 0.2, 0.25, 0.1, 0.6,
0.7 and 0.8. This bunching pattern is consistent with couples using simple ad-hoc rules
for entrepreneurial income sharing. All points with major bunching are detected by
the McCrary test. Again, bunching affects the estimates in other neighboring points.
However, the disturbance created by bunching at 0.5 is particularly large.
4.9 Evidence from the United States
The above evidence suggests that, in Finland, the discontinuity and the excess mass
at 0.5 are due to the equalization of earnings in self-employed couples and to conver-
gence of earnings in couples co-working in the same firm. In this section, we discuss
whether this explanation may also apply to the United States.
Unfortunately, the SIPP/SSA/IRS dataset used by Bertrand et al. (2015) does
not include information on the firm where individuals work or indicate whether they
are self-employed. Information from other sources suggests that, in the United States,
11-13% of wage-earning spouses work for the same employer and about 3% of working
couples are simultaneously self-employed.14
The phenomenon of earnings equalization is less relevant in the United States than
in Finland. In the United States, only 0.3% of couples have identical earnings, com-
pared to 0.9% in Finland. Some American self-employed couples may want to equalize
earnings to simplify accounting or, perhaps, to avoid within-family negotiations. How-
ever, in the United States, unlike in Finland, there are no legal defaults for income
sharing in partnerships, and households can jointly file their income tax declarations.
For couples co-working in the same firm, the impact of earnings compression is likely
to have a similar effect as in Finland. To assess the relevance of income convergence in
14Hyatt (2015) estimates the share of co-working couples among wage earners using data from the
U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program. The estimate
of the proportion of simultaneously self-employed couples is our own based on data from the American
Community Survey (ACS) 2008-2011.
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co-working couples, we use the SIPP/SSA/IRS dataset and we proxy whether spouses
work together using available information on industry and occupation. It seems rea-
sonable to expect that the share of co-working couples is substantially higher among
couples working in the same industry and occupation.15 Instead, couples working in
different industries are unlikely to work in the same firm; although some self-employed
couples may be included in this group.16
We observe that around 20% of all couples work in the same industry and occupa-
tion, while 60% of couples work in different industries. Figure 9 shows the distribution
of relative earnings separately for these two groups of couples. The drop in the distri-
bution at 0.5 is significantly larger among couples working in the same industry and
occupation. According to the McCrary test, the estimate of the drop is 14%: about
twice as large as the drop observed in the overall population. This evidence suggests
that factors leading to earnings convergence in co-working couples are also likely to play
a significant role in explaining the existence of a discontinuity in the United States.
5 Conclusions
We study the underlying causes for the existence of a sharp drop to the right of 0.5 in the
distribution of households according to the share of total earnings earned by the wife.
This discontinuity, which was originally observed by Bertrand et al. (2015) among U.S.
households, has been attributed to the existence of a gender identity norm prescribing
a breadwinner role to men. According to this hypothesis, couples where women even
slightly outearn men are significantly less likely to be formed, more likely to divorce,
and women in this couples tend to reduce their labor supply to avoid outearning their
spouses.
We propose an alternative explanation. We argue that the discontinuity to the right
15According to Hyatt (2015), among couples working in the same narrowly defined Census industry
and Census occupation, the proportion of co-working couples is 83%. The level of disaggregation
available in the SIPP/SSA/IRS dataset is much lower than in the study by Hyatt. Industries are
classified into only four categories, and occupations are divided into three categories. Information on
industry and occupation is missing for 15% of couples.
16If we apply SIPP/SSA/IRS industry classification to the ACS data, we observe that 24% of jointly
self-employed couples report to work in different industries.
25
of 0.5 can emerge if some couples tend toward earnings equalization or convergence. To
test this hypothesis, we exploit the rich employer-employee linked data from Finland.
We find overwhelming support in favor of the idea that the discontinuity is caused by
earnings equalization in self-employed couples and earnings convergence among spouses
working together. We show that the discontinuity is not generated by selective couple
formation or separation and it arises only among self-employed and co-working couples
who account for 15% of the population.
Self-employed couples are responsible for most observations with spouses reporting
identical earnings. When couples start being self-employed, both sides of the distribu-
tion tend to equalize earnings, perhaps because earnings equalization helps couples to
reduce income tax payments, facilitate accounting, or avoid unnecessary within-family
negotiations. Large spikes emerge not only at 0.5 but also at other round shares sig-
naling the prevalence of ad-hoc rules for entrepreneurial income sharing in couples.
Self-employment is associated with a fall of household earnings below the level pre-
dicted by individuals’ predetermined characteristics, but this drop is mainly due to a
decrease in male earnings, with women being relatively better off.
In the case of couples who work together in the same firm, there is a compression
of the earnings distribution toward 0.5 both on the right and on the left of 0.5. As a
result, there is an increase both in the share of couples where men slightly outearn their
wives and in the share of couples where women slightly outearn their husbands. Since
the former group is larger, earnings compression leads to a detection of a discontinuity.
Notably, we observe a similar earnings compression and a discontinuity in relative
earnings among fictitious couples that we construct by randomly matching unrelated
women and men co-working in the same firm. This ‘placebo’ suggests that firm-level
factors contribute to the emergence of the discontinuity. We also observe that, in
couples who start co-working, household earnings tend to increase above the level
predicted by spouses’ observable characteristics and this increase is mainly driven by a
jump in female earnings above their earnings potential. This increase in female earnings
is consistent with women in co-working couples gaining from joint negotiations with
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the employer, or with couples choosing to co-work only if it implies a substantial
improvement in female earnings. Overall, the evidence suggests that the observed
discontinuity is not due to the existence of a social norm that limits the income of
married women. Paradoxically, it is a result of a phenomenon, co-working couples,
that helps women to have higher earnings.
Due to data limitations, we are not able to provide comparable evidence for the
United States, but we find that the discontinuity is twice as large among households
with spouses working in the same industry and occupation, and hence having a higher
likelihood of being co-employed. Arguably, this pattern also supports the relevance of
the hypothesis of earnings convergence in households with co-working spouses as an
explanation for the discontinuity in the United States. Nonetheless, a more comprehen-
sive analysis using administrative data on individual earnings and employment histories
needs to be conducted to confirm the validity and significance of this hypothesis.
While our results suggest that the discontinuity should not be considered as evidence
for the existence of the gender identity norm, we would like to emphasize that this does
not imply that the norm does not play an important role in the marriage market and
in women’s labor supply decisions. It is possible that the norm only gradually gains
importance with the increase in the relative earnings of women, and there is no sharp
discontinuity or kink in the utility function immediately to the right of the point with
equal earnings of spouses. Further research is needed to test this hypothesis.
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Notes: The data on panel (a) are on married couples observed in SIPP/SSA/IRS Completed Gold
Standard Files, 1990-2004. On panel (b), the data is on cohabiting and married couples from FLEED,
1988-2014. In both cases, the sample is restricted to couples with both partners aged between 18 and
65 years and receiving positive earned income. Each dot indicates a fraction of couples in a 2% relative
income bin; bins are right-closed. The dashed line is the lowess smoother applied to the distribution
allowing for a break at 0.5. The dark-colored crosses and dashed line show the fraction of couples
in each bin and the lowess smoother calculated after excluding households with identical earnings of
both spouses.
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Figure 2: Relative earnings of women after various hypothetical adjustments, simu-
lation
(a) 5% of couples to the right of 0.5 reduce
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Notes: The figure uses simulated data to demonstrate how various forces discussed in section 2 can
transform a smooth distribution of the relative earnings of women (shown in blue) into a distribution
that exhibits a discontinuity at 0.5 (shown in red). To construct the data, we first assumed that
female and male earnings are distributed respectively as Γ(5, 5000) and Γ(7, 5000). We then defined
couples by randomly matching one million men and women.
The dots indicate a fraction of couples in a 2% relative income bin; bins are right-closed. The lines
show the estimate of the density function obtained using the McCrary (2008) procedure with default
estimation options, allowing for discontinuity just to the right of 0.5.
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Notes: FLEED, 1988-2014. The sample includes couples that were initially identified as a couple
based on their cohabitation status and observed for at least 15 years.
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Figure 4: Relative earnings of women, by co-working status
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Notes: FLEED, 1988-2014. The sample includes couples, in which both partners are employed and
have positive earnings. Each dot is a fraction of couples in a 2% relative income bin; bins are right-
closed. The dark-colored crosses show the fraction of couples in each bin after excluding households
with identical earnings of both spouses.
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Notes: FLEED, 1988-2014. The sample includes couples, in which both partners are employed and
have positive earnings. Each dot is a fraction of couples in a 2% relative income bin; bins are right-
closed. The dark-colored crosses show the fraction of couples in each bin after excluding households
with identical earnings of both spouses.
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Figure 6: Dynamics of the relative earnings of women
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Notes: FLEED, 1988-2014. The sample includes couples that start co-working during cohabitation,
either as a self-employed couple or as wage earners in the same firm; it is restricted to couples that
were initially identified as a couple based on their cohabitation status and are observed for at least
15 years. Each dot is a fraction of couples in a 2% relative income bin; bins are right-closed.
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Notes: FLEED, 1988-2014. Predicted earnings are obtained using out-of-the-sample prediction from
a model estimated on a sample of individuals who never worked together with their spouses by
regressing individual earnings in each particular year into the relationship on predetermined main
activity, industry, occupation, earnings, indicator for zero earnings, age dummies, nationality, family
structure, education level and field, and region of residence as observed the year before the start of
cohabitation. Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 8: Evolution of the relative earnings in pairs of randomly matched men and















0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Share earned by the woman
1 year before co-working 1 year of co-working
15 years of co-working
Notes: FLEED, 1988-2014. The sample consists of pairs formed by randomly matched unrelated men
and women co-working in the same plant. The sample is restricted to pairs in which individuals have
a similar educational level (high school or lower versus some college or higher), in which men are
between zero and four years older than women, and who co-worked in the same firm for at least 15
years. Each dot is a fraction of pairs in a 2% relative income bin; bins are right-closed.
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All Excluding 0.5




















0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Share earned by the wife
All Excluding 0.5
Notes: SIPP/SSA/IRS Completed Gold Standard Files, 1990-2004. The sample includes married
couples with both partners aged between 18 and 65 years and receiving positive earned income. Each
dot indicates the fraction of couples in a 2% relative income bin; bins are right-closed. The dashed
lines are the lowess smoothers applied to the distribution allowing for a break at 0.5.
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Table 1: Equal earners and the discontinuity at 0.5 in the distribution of
the female share of household earnings, by co-working status
1 2 3 4
Number of % of all % equal Log Distance
observations observations earners at 0.5
All employed couples 16 676 004 100 0.89 -0.113
(0.003)
Different firms 12 972 527 77.8 0.01 -0.002
(0.004)
Same industry 195 304 1.2 0.02 -0.039
(0.017)
Different industries 12 704 413 76.2 0.01 -0.002
(0.004)
Missing info on industry 72 810 0.4 0.02 -0.013
(0.029)
Same firm or both self-employed 2 354 062 13.4 6.2 -0.405
(0.004)
Both self-employed 1 045 301 5.5 13.4 -0.617
(0.005)
Same firm 1 308 761 7.9 0.4 -0.094
(0.007)
Same establishment 767 962 4.6 0.6 -0.160
(0.008)
Different establishments 500 110 3.0 0.03 -0.021
(0.012)
Missing establishment codes 40 689 0.2 0.5 -0.168
(0.031)
Missing employer code 1 349 415 8.2 0.2 -0.022
(0.009)
Same industry 25 979 0.2 0.7 -0.101
(0.046)
Different industries 1 039 822 6.3 0.1 -0.013
(0.010)
Missing info on industry 283 614 1.7 0.2 -0.064
(0.018)
Note: FLEED, 1988-2014. The sample includes couples, in which both partners are employed and
have positive earnings. The group missing employer code includes employed spouses who are not
self-employed and for whom there is no information about the identity of the employer. Industry is
coded along 4-digit categories between 1988 and 1992 and along 5-digit categories between 1993 and
2014. Column 4 shows the log-distance at 0.5 between the left and right limits of the density function
estimated after excluding observations at 0.5 using the McCrary (2008) procedure with default bins
and bandwidths. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2: Equal earners and the discontinuity at 0.5 in co-working couples,
by business characteristics
1 2 3 4 5 6
Both self-employed Same establishment
% of all % equal Log Distance % of all % equal Log Distance
observations earners at 0.5 observations earners at 0.5
All 100 0.56 -0.160 100 13.4 -0.617
(0.008) (0.005)
Sector:
Agriculture 58.5 13.0 -0.710 1.9 1.8 -0.367
(0.006) (0.040)
Wholesale, retail, 5.6 13.0 -0.325 6.1 1.2 -0.233
repair of vehicles (0.025) (0.030)
Manufacturing 4.8 13.7 -0.471 32.7 0.2 -0.210
(0.025) (0.014)
Education 1.0 12.7 -0.366 8.7 0.3 -0.150
(0.047) (0.022)
Other 30.1 14.3 -0.408 50.6 0.7 -0.072
(0.010) (0.009)
Legal form:
Natural person 28.6 15.2 -0.543 1.2 2.2 -0.438
(0.010) (0.064)
Partnership 2.3 35.1 -0.336 3.5 0.8 -0.420
(0.032) (0.036)
Limited company 5.1 8.4 -0.278 65.7 0.6 -0.165
(0.022) (0.010)
Government authority 0.0 - - 22.0 0.1 -0.154
or enterprise (0.015)
Other 64.0 12.2 -0.682 7.5 0.7 -0.292
(0.006) (0.023)
Establishment size:
1-4 employees 59.6 11.7 -0.744 11.9 2.6 -0.217
(0.007) (0.021)
5-49 employees 2.4 16.1 -0.389 25.2 0.7 -0.231
(0.029) (0.016)
≥50 employees 0.0 - - 40.1 0.05 -0.171
(0.012)
Missing info on size 37.9 16.0 -0.501 22.8 0.2 -0.146
(0.007) (0.014)
Note: FLEED, 1988-2014. The sample includes couples, in which both partners are employed and have
positive earnings. Column 3 and 6 show the log-distance at 0.5 between the left and right limits of the
density function estimated after excluding observations at 0.5 using the McCrary (2008) procedure with
default bins and bandwidths. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Appendix A. Appendix tables and figures
Figure A1: Evolution of household earnings around the start of cohabitation











































-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Years together
Men Women
Notes: FLEED, 1988-2014. The sample includes couples that were initially identified as a couple
based on their cohabitation status and observed for at least 15 years.
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Share earned by the woman the year before the start of cohabitation
All couples




















0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Share earned by the woman the year before the start of cohabitation
All couples
Couples that eventually start working in the same firm
Notes: FLEED, 1988-2014. The sample includes couples with both partners being employed and
receiving positive earned income at the year of marriage. Each dot is a fraction of couples in a 2%
relative income bin; bins are right-closed.
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Share earned by the woman the year before the start of cohabitation
All couples
Spouses that eventually receive identical earnings
Notes: FLEED, 1988-2014. The sample includes couples with both partners being employed and
receiving positive earned income at the year of marriage. Each dot is a fraction of couples in a 2%
relative income bin; bins are right-closed.
Figure A4: Relative earnings of women, by educational level and co-working status
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0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Share earned by the woman
Work together Do not work together
Notes: FLEED, 1988-2014. The sample includes couples with both partners being employed and
receiving positive earned income at the year of marriage. Each dot is a fraction of couples in a 2%
relative income bin; bins are right-closed.
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Share earned by the woman
3 years before the start of cohabitation
2 years before the start of cohabitation
1 year before the start of cohabitation
1 year after the start of cohabitation
Notes: FLEED, 1988-2014. The sample includes couples that started to cohabit after being coworkers
in the same firm for at least 3 years.
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Notes: FLEED, 1988-2014. Predicted earnings are obtained using out-of-the-sample prediction from a
model estimated on a sample of individuals who never worked together with their spouses by regressing
individual labor market outcomes in each particular year into the relationship on predetermined main
activity, industry, occupation, earnings, indicator for zero earnings, age dummies, nationality, family
structure, education level and field, and region of residence as observed the year before the start of
cohabitation. Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Notes: FLEED, 1988-2014. Predicted earnings are obtained using out-of-the-sample prediction from a
model estimated on a sample of individuals who never worked together with their spouses by regressing
individual labor market outcomes in each particular year into the relationship on predetermined main
activity, industry, occupation, earnings, indicator for zero earnings, age dummies, nationality, family
structure, education level and field, and region of residence as observed the year before the start of
cohabitation. Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Estimate 95 CI
Notes: McCrary (2008) estimates of the discontinuity in the distribution of female relative earnings
to the right of each 2-percentage point bin between 0.1 and 0.9, with 95% confidence intervals (CI).
All estimates are based on default bandwidths and bin-sizes.
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Table A1: McCrary tests, marriage versus start of cohabitation
1 2 3 4
Number of % of % equal Log Distance
observations observations earners at 0.5, excl.
equal earners
First year of marriage 415 666 100 0.2 -0.041
(0.015)
Not co-working couples 342 929 82.5 0.00 -0.029
(0.017)
Co-working couples 44 809 10.8 1.9 -0.193
(0.027)
First year of cohabitation 654 087 100 0.04 -0.014
(0.012)
Couples that eventually marry 233 322 35.7 0.04 -0.016
(0.019)
Couples that never marry 420 589 64.3 0.04 -0.023
(0.014)
Not co-working couples 552 301 84.4 0.00 -0.007
(0.013)
Co-working couples 64 564 9.9 0.3 -0.113
(0.024)
Note: FLEED, 1988-2014. Households in which partners have identical earnings are excluded.
Column 4 shows the log-distance at 0.5 between the left and right limits of the density function
estimated after excluding observations at 0.5 using the McCrary (2008) procedure with default
bins and bandwidths. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table A2: McCrary tests, by educational level and co-working status
1 2 3 4
Number of % of % of Log Distance at 0.5,
observations observations equal excl. 0.5
earners
Both college or higher 3 519 220 100 0.2 -0.045
(0.006)
Different firms 2 914 072 82.8 0.01 -0.003
(0.008)
Both self-employed 75 176 2.1 9.5 -0.449
(0.018)
Same firm 343 112 9.7 0.2 -0.094
(0.012)
Missing employer code 186 860 5.3 0.1 -0.071
(0.021)
Both high school or lower 8 524 389 100 1.3 -0.171
(0.003)
Different firms 6 279 087 73.7 0.01 -0.002
(0.005)
Both self-employed 787 423 9.2 14.0 -0.700
(0.006)
Same firm 652 832 7.7 0.4 -0.151
(0.009)
Missing employer code 805 047 9.4 0.2 -0.039
(0.011)
Note: FLEED, 1988-2014. The sample includes couples with both partners being employed and
receiving positive earnings. Households in which partners have identical earnings are excluded.
The group missing employer code includes employed spouses who are not self-employed and
for whom there is no information about the identity of the employer. Column 4 shows the log-
distance at 0.5 between the left and right limits of the density function estimated after excluding
observations at 0.5 using the McCrary (2008) procedure with default bins and bandwidths.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table A3: McCrary tests, randomly matched unrelated women and men
co-working in the same plant
% of equal Log Distance
earners at 0.5, excl. 0.5
All pairs 0.02 -0.055
(0.014)
Only pairs that eventually are observed co-working for at least 15 years:
1 year before the start of co-working 0.01 -0.035
(0.060)
1 year of co-working 0.01 -0.052
(0.038)
5 years of co-working 0.04 -0.146
(0.034)
10 years of co-working 0.06 -0.054
(0.023)
15 years of co-working 0.03 -0.129
(0.030)
Note: FLEED, 1988-2014. The tables shows the log-distance at 0.5 between the left and right
limits of the density function estimated after excluding observations at 0.5 using the McCrary (2008)
procedure with default bins and bandwidths. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample consists
of pairs formed by randomly matched unrelated men and women co-working in the same plant. The
sample is restricted to pairs in which individuals have a similar educational level (high school or
lower versus some college or higher) and in which men are between zero and four years older than
women.
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